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The common law theory and practice of the Ombudsman/judiciary 
relationship 
Richard Kirkham and Anita Sthumcke  
 
 
 
Abstract 
In both Australia and the United Kingdom the ombudsman sector plays a specific role in the 
oversight of the administration of government, but there exists no clear overarching theoretical 
framework within which the institution is aligned with common law constitutionalism. An 
RPEXGPDQ¶Vfunctionality is secured by gaining legal authority from parliament and effective 
power through executive acquiescence, but simultaneously to function effectively it must 
maintain a degree of separation from the executive and parliament. This situation creates a 
regulatory gap which the courts fill by acting in a supervisory relationship over the ombudsman 
sector. In turn, this raises the danger that the legitimacy gained through judicial oversight 
results in a loss of flexibility and uniqueness in the ombudsman institution. Through an 
empirical study of the case law on the sector this article confirms that the courts have shaped 
and legitimised the role of the ombudsman institution under the common law constitution. Yet 
this study also suggests that there is a risk that over reliance upon the judiciary to perform a 
retrospective, reactive and intermittent control function can lead to both an inappropriate 
imposition of judicial values on the ombudsman sector as well as the courts performing an 
unsuited regulatory role.   
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Introduction  
Through an empirical study of the case law on the ombudsman sector in Australia and the 
United Kingdom, the claim of this article is that the augmentation of Anglo-Commonwealth 
systems of government with the ombudsman institution created a regulatory gap in 
constitutional arrangements that the judiciary has been required to fill. The article further 
explores the nature of this relationship and raises the question as to whether this is an 
appropriate role for the judiciary to perform, or a temporary flexing of relationships which 
requires further adaptation to preserve a robust distribution of powers between the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary.   
 
The focus of this paper is upon ombudschemes.1 This label takes in a broad spectrum of 
institutions, which may be public or private or a hybrid of both, either statutory or voluntarily 
organised, and including ombudschemes with very different cultures and practices. 2  The 
                                                 
1
 2XU ZULWLQJ LV PLQGIXO RI WKH JHQGHUHG XVH RI WKH WHUP µRPEXGVPDQ¶ 7KURXJKRXW WKLV DUWLFOH WKH WHUP
µRPEXGVFKHPHV¶RUµRPEXGVPDQVHFWRU¶LVXVHGDVDGHVFULSWRUWRFDSWXUHWKHEUHDGWKDQGUDQJHRIWKHVHFWRU
µ2PEXGVPDQ¶LVXVHGWRLQGLFDWHUHIHUHQFHWRDVLQJXODURIILFHDQGµRPEXGVPHQ¶DVDSOXUDOLVDYRLGHG 
2
 Margaret Doyle, Varda Bondy and Carolyn Hirst, The use of informal resolution approaches by ombudsmen in 
the UK and Ireland: A mapping study (Hot off the Press, 2014) 4; Australian Productivity Commission, Access to 
Justice Arrangements, Inquiry Paper No 72 (2014). 
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continuing growth and proactive role of ombudschemes KDVEHHQGXEEHGDQµHQWHUSULVH¶3 in 
the UK and in Australia it is an ongoing debate as to whether some dispute resolution bodies 
sKRXOG FDUU\ WKH WLWOH µRPEXGVPDQ¶ ,Q WKLV VWXG\ WKH WLWOH ZDV QRW GHHPHG DQ LPSRUWDQW
consideration, instead included are all schemes which meet the definition deployed by the 
International Ombudsman Institute:4 an RPEXGVPDQLVDERG\ZKLFKµRIIHUVLQGHSHQGHQWDQG
objective consideration of complaints, aimed at correcting injustices caused to an individual as 
DUHVXOWRIPDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ 
 
The UK and Australia are the chosen common law jurisdictions for this comparative study. 
This is due to the shared government preference to promote and utilise ombudschemes across 
multiple sectors and geographical areas. Evidence of this is the proliferation of ombudsman-
like bodies operating across both jurisdictions. Ombudsman bodies and functions have been 
both established or disestablished on the basis of fast moving (and sometimes conflicting) 
political, legal, social and commercial regulatory goals. Subsequently, the creation and 
application of ombudschemes in the UK and Australia has led to a demand for a judicial 
response. This similarity in trend makes the selection of Australia and the UK for a comparative 
study pressing, as case law across both jurisdictions builds in quantity and develops into a 
GLVWLQFWµRPEXGVSUXGHQFH¶ 
 
                                                 
3
 Trevor Buck, Richard Kirkham and Brian Thompson, The Ombudsman Enterprise and Administrative Justice 
(Ashgate, 2011). 
4
 International Ombudsman Institute (2012) Bylaws, Adopted by the General Assembly in Wellington, New 
Zealand, 13 November 2012, preamble. See also the definition of the Ombudsman Association and the Australian 
and New Zealand Ombudsman Association. 
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While focused on case law concerning ombudschemes in Australia and the UK this article is 
illustrative of wider debates about the nature of Anglo-Commonwealth common law, 
particularly in public law. 5   Anglo-Commonwealth common law is built upon a set of 
interrelated traditions, grounded in the 19th Century Westminster model. That model has been 
revised and revisited to suit modern day needs.6  Most relevantly, this has included the addition 
of civil law innovations in administrative justice such as the ombudsman institution. The 
evolution of the ombudsman sector however has been both rapid and remarkably ad hoc, with 
each new institution introduced to serve a specific purpose at a specific time. There has been 
little attempt by policy-makers to conform to a particular WKHRUHWLFDOPRGHORIDQµRPEXGVPDQ¶
or a systematic plan as to how to structure the institution within the Anglo-Commonwealth 
common law tradition.7 This approach creates risks. 
A shared theme behind the introduction of ombudschemes is that modern government 
implicitly accepts that courts are not necessarily the best or the final recourse to justice for 
citizens and uses the ombudsman sector to block the growth of litigation in both the public and 
private domain.8 Thus the value and deliverability of civil justice may have been expanded 
through the rise of the ombudsman sector, yet the trend also represents a trade-off in how justice 
                                                 
5
 Dean Knight, Vigilance and Restraint (Cambridge, CUP, 2018). 
6
 RAW Rhodes, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, Comparing Westminster (Oxford, OUP, 2009).   
7
 For example, most recently in the UK, see Robert Gordon, Better to Serve the Public: Proposals to restructure, 
reform, renew and reinvigorate public services ombudsmen (UK Cabinet Office, 2014). For an overview of the 
Australian context see Anita 6WXKPFNHµ2PEXGV&DQ2PEXGV&DQ¶W2PEXGV6KRXOG2PEXGV6KDQ¶W$&DOO
WR,PSURYH(YDOXDWLRQRIWKH2PEXGVPDQ,QVWLWXWLRQ¶, in Marc Hertogh and Richard Kirkham (eds), Research 
Handbook on the Ombudsman  (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018).  
8
 On the resistance of the UK Government to judicial solutions in public law in the post WWII period, see TT 
Arvind and Lindsay 6WLUWRQµ7KH&XULRXV2ULJLQVRI-XGLFLDO5HYLHZ¶Law Quarterly Review 91.  
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is provided. 9  Legal systems are holistic however. Change one part and the whole is 
simultaneously impacted and new challenges thereby created. The trade-off in favour of the 
ombudsman method has, in some respects, introduced a more expansive and interventionist 
justice model than the courts, and thereby has given rise to a fresh regulatory dilemma for 
governments, namely how to ensure an acceptable quality of justice provision in the 
ombudsman sector. This task has generally been left unaddressed in most legislation and to fill 
the consequent gaps in oversight and reputational risks, a variety of solutions have been 
adopted.  For example, absent of a robust government-led regulatory response, the ombudsman 
sector itself KDVRIWHQWDNHQWKHLQLWLDWLYHLQGHYHORSLQJµRPEXGVQRUPV¶.10   
Additionally, however, we suggest that across the Anglo-Commonwealth, the critical 
role of courts in maintaining the accountability of the sector is both overlooked and 
underestimated. With respect to ombudschemes accountability is a term typically used to refer 
to the accountability of other bodies to ombudschemes, and to its jurisdiction to oversee and 
make binding or non-binding decisions in response to breaches of industry standards or 
maladministration. Less typical is the use of the term to describe the mechanisms which render 
ombudschemes accountable, this is the focus of this paper which explores their accountability 
to the courts.  
To illustrate the point, we use a study of the case law in Australia and the UK to show 
that courts have restrained the informality and expediency of ombudschemes. Arguably, the 
solutions developed have been mostly constructive and necessary, and have bolstered the 
                                                 
9
 7KLV ZDV D µGDQJHU¶ ZDUQHG RI VLQFH WKH LQFHSWLRQ RI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ VHH ,an * 0DF/HRG  µ7KH
OmbudsmDQ¶Australian Law Reports ZKLFKFRQWDLQVVWDWHPHQWVVXFKDVµHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH
RIILFHZRXOGRQO\GHOD\PXFKQHHGHGUHIRUPRIRXUV\VWHPRISXEOLFODZ¶ 
10
 For example, standards have been developed by ombudschemes in the UK through the Ombudsman Association 
and in Australia through the Australian and New Zealand Ombudsman Association (ANZOA). 
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autonomy of the institution and helped reshape the constitutional landscape to create a clear 
space for ombudschemes to operate within. But the use of the courts for this regulatory function 
throws up interesting challenges to standard theorising around the judicial/political division of 
labour in the Anglo-Commonwealth model, and the position of ombudschemes within this 
division. It also creates the risk that too much reliance on the judiciary to perform a 
retrospective, reactive and intermittent control function can lead to an inappropriate imposition 
of judicial values on the ombudsman sector.11 Another concern is that the process by which the 
sector has adjusted to judicial decision-making is uncoordinated and the continuing weak 
regulatory regime makes it inevitable that future judicial interventions will be necessary.   
We suggest that while the ex-post facto role of the courts is critical to the effective 
supervision of ombudschemes, additional forms of holistic regulatory oversight are also 
required. To make this argument we begin by outlining the theoretical and regulatory context 
in which ombudschemes are situated in both Australia and the UK. We then in two stages 
present and analyse the evidence of extensive judicial oversight of the institution in both 
countries. First we clarify the nature of that relationship, identifying the courts as performing 
a supervisory function, and then second we explore the intensity and nature of supervision 
applied. We conclude that the current reliance upon the judiciary to restrain ombudschemes, 
requires further adaptation. We advocate a considered regulatory response which will reduce 
the need for the courts to operate as a key regulatory restraint on ombudschemes, while 
maintaining the unique nature of the ombudsman institution across Anglo-Commonwealth 
systems of government. 
 
                                                 
11
 On this concern see Shelly Maxwell v The Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1236, at [37-8] per Lord Justice Mummery; Buck et al (nx) ch.2.  
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The normative and regulatory context of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the ombudsman institution 
The primary role of an ombudsman is to adjudicate upon complaints, with the model being 
introduced steadily in both Australia and the UK over a fifty-year period, across first the public 
and then the private sector. The diversity of schemes in operation is extraordinary, including 
public, industry or organisational forms, which have developed in both a reactive and disparate 
manner. The additions continue, with the latest in the UK being the Rail Ombudsman12 and in 
Australia an Ombudsman heads the newly created Australian Financial Complaints 
Authority.13 The result is that, as of June 2019, there were at least 18 ombudschemes in current 
operation in the UK that could in principle be subject to judicial review or other public law 
litigation. Ten of these ombudschemes have been a party to public law litigation already, all of 
which were established by statute. The Australian experience has been markedly analogous.  
As at June 2019 there are 17 Australian federal, state and territory Ombudsman, both public 
law and private industry,14 and 12 of these have been a party to litigation.   
Across both Australia and the UK, governments have adopted an approach towards 
delivering civil justice through ombudschemes which is best described as ad hoc.15  Both 
governments have also assumed a minimal role in the regulation of the quality of services in 
the sector and a preference for detailing powers in broad discretionary form.   
                                                 
12
 Rail Ombudsman, < https://www.railombudsman.org/about-us/our-people/> accessed 15 January 2019. 
13
 Australian Financial Complaints Authority, <https://afca.org.au/> accessed 7 January 2019. 
14
 Not included in this study are offices that have been excluded from membership of ANZOA. Some of these 
RIILFHVIHDWXUHKHDYLO\LQOLWLJDWLRQDQGKDYHWKHWLWOHµ2PEXGVPDQ¶such as the Fair Work Ombudsman. 
15
 See further Varda %RQG\DQG$QGUHZ/H6XHXUµ'HVLJQLQJUHGUHVVDVWXG\DERXWJULHYDQFHVDJDLQVWSXEOLF
ERGLHV¶ 3XEOLF /DZ 3URMHFW  <http://repository.essex.ac.uk/7416/1/SSRN-id2154195.pdf> accessed 25 
October 2019. 
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In Australia, while legislation exists to establish and circumscribe the operation of most 
public and industry ombudsman, the role that government has performed in overseeing the 
sector has been OLPLWHGWRµDKDQGIXO¶RIH[WHUQDOLQTXLULHVDQGVWDWXWRU\UHYLHZV.16  Where a 
thorough government-led rethink of the institution does occur it is generally in response to 
crisis,17  or is generated by a narrow window of opportunity to move forward reforming 
legislation. The main ongoing controls that do exist are budgetary in nature.18  Likewise, 
although Parliamentary oversight does occur and can be effective, such as where the New South 
Wales Ombudsman operates with oversight of a NSW parliamentary committee, it tends to be 
driven by events and is rarely systematic.  
In the UK, a similar dynamic applies.19 The Government had the opportunity to impose 
a tough and autonomous system of regulation for the ombudsman sector under the EU Directive 
on Consumer ADR (2013/11/EU.), which required industry ombudschemes to report to a 
µFRPSHWHQW DXWKRULW\¶+RZHYHU WKH FKRLFHZDV PDGH WR DGRSW DQRQ-specialised approach 
towards ADR regulation by making a series of pre-existent sector specific market regulators 
µFRPSHWHQWDXWKRULWLHV¶.20 The Government simultaneously encouraged competition in ADR 
provision. Through this light-touch and market-led approach, not only has the competent 
authority role had little to no impact on public ombudschemes, in the consumer/private sector 
                                                 
16
 Stuhmcke (n 7). 
17
 Anita 6WXKPFNHµ$XVWUDOLDQ2PEXGVPDQ$&DOOWR7DNH&DUH¶Federal Law Review 531.   
18
 Stuhmcke (n 7).  
19
 )RUH[DPSOHWKH8.3DUOLDPHQW¶VUHYLHZRIWKH/RFDO*RYHUQPHQW2PEXGVPDQLQOHGWRUHIRUPEXWZDV
the first review for seven years. See (Communities and Local Government Committee, 2012, The work of the 
Local Government Ombudsman, 2012-13, HC 431). 
20
 Richard .LUNKDPµ7KHFRQVXPHURPEXGVPDQPRGHODQGWKH$'5'LUHFWLYH/HVVRQVIURPWKH8.¶ in Pablo 
Cortes (ed), The New Regulatory Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution (Oxford: OUP, 2016). 
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the result has been the imposition of minimal standards largely focused on reporting 
requirements and easy to measure performance standards.   
To complete the regulatory picture, in both Australia and the UK the ombudsman sector 
has moved towards a measure of voluntary regulation through the work of ombudsman 
DVVRFLDWLRQV ZKLFK SURYLGH D IUDPHZRUN RI µOLJKW WRXFK DFFUHGLWDWLRQ¶, 21  built upon the 
common history and shared characteristics and norms of the institution. However, these 
associations, while normatively important, are non-governmental and have neither the power 
nor backing to create and enforce a framework of practice for ombudschemes. They have also 
shown little appetite for regulatory activity and have tended to operate more as forums for 
debate and sharing best practice.22 The end result is that schemes themselves have been left to 
create their own control environment through the introduction of such devices as boards and 
advisory forums. 
It is into this diverseORRVHDQGJHQHUDOO\µOLJKW-WRXFK¶UHJXODWRU\HQYLURQPHQWWKDWWKH
judiciary interacts with ombudschemes. It is the nature of this interaction which is of interest 
in this article, with the possibility that the relationship between the two bodies could be one of 
partnership between justice providers, or some form of accountability hierarchy. The potential 
for a strong partnership relationship, whether through the division of labour or establishing 
prospective standards of good administration, is not explored here. Instead, the focus is on the 
degree to, and manner in, which the courts have taken on a hierarchical oversight role of the 
ombudsman sector, and the risks identified in that role.  
 
                                                 
21
 John 0F0LOODQ µ:KDW¶V LQ D 1DPH" 8VH RI WKH WHUP µ2PEXGVPDQ¶" 3UHVHQWDWLRQ  $SULO 
<https://www.ombudsman.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/30104/22-April-2008-Whats-in-a-name-Use-of-
the-term-Ombudsman.pdf> accessed 13 June 2018. 
22
 Stuhmcke (n 7). 
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The Judge and the Ombudsman: a hierarchical relationship?  
Theorising the constitutional status of ombudschemes  
To understand the nature of the hierarchical relationship that exists between ombudschemes 
and the courts, it is necessary to appreciate the loose constitutional status of the ombudsman.  
The ombudsman institXWLRQ KDV EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV D µFRQVWLWXWLRQDO PLVILW¶, 23  an account 
VXSSRUWHGE\WKHODFNRIIRUPDOµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶UHIHUHQFHWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQLQHLWKHU$XVWUDOLD
or the UK, and the reliance of most schemes on statutory mandates. Thus it is expected to play 
a powerful role in delivering administrative and civil justice, and additionally to contribute 
towards the wider advancement of good administration and systemic learning.24 Yet despite 
the import of this role, within the Anglo-Commonwealth constitution the ombudsman is a 
second order institution whose power, independence and continued existence is dependent on 
the ongoing retention of Parliamentary support.25  
What this status means for the ombudsman sector and its relationship with the courts is 
unclear. Each individual scheme has its own legislative mandate and unique features, but one 
generalisable feature of ombudsman legislation is that it is mostly silent on the nature of the 
ombudsman/court relationship. This silence leaves considerable scope for disagreement as to 
the preferred relationship. We suggest that four explanatory models provide a useful typology 
                                                 
23
 Rick 6QHOOµ7RZDUGVDQ8QGHUVWDQGLQJRID&RQVWLWXWLRQDO0LVILW)RXU6QDSVKRWVRIWKH2PEXGVPDQ(QLJPD¶, 
in Chris Finn (ed), Sunrise or Sunset? Administrative Law in the New Millennium (Canberra: Australian Institute 
of Administrative Law, 2000).   
24
 Buck et al (n 3) ch.4. 
25
 Chris *LOO µThe evolving role of the ombudsman: a conceptual and constitutional analysis of the "Scottish 
VROXWLRQWRDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFH¶Public Law 662. 
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of the options available, and help us understand both how the ombudsman fits into the legal 
order and how the courts perceive its role.  
x Under the first model (the small-claims court model) an ombudsman is fully integrated 
into the existing judicial branch of the constitution. Here the ombudsman operates as a 
specialised substitute service to the courts, but is heavily interlinked with the judicial 
branch in terms of the boundaries of what it can decide (ie decisions made broadly in 
line with legal principles) and through an appeal process.  
x By contrast, the second model (the political model) situates the work of the ombudsman 
firmly in the political branch of the constitutional order.26 To this extent it has influence 
on the political process of administrative decision-making yet creates no new 
administrative rights or expectations and therefore should not be subject to judicial 
control, other than against standard legal obligations eg employment and contract law. 
Further, oversight and regulation of an ombudsman is exercised purely through the 
political domain, whether Parliamentary or Executive organised.   
x By a third model (the supervisory model) both the courts and the political branch have 
oversight responsibilities over the ombudsman sector. The judicial input to this 
supervisory arrangement is very much focused on isolated instances of ombudsman 
decision-making, but importantly not on the merit of individual grievance. Instead, the 
court has a role to play in testing the legality of the decisions made, but it may also 
                                                 
26
 Jason NE Varuhas, Judicial Capture of Political Accountability (London, Policy Exchange, 2016), 50 
<http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Judicial-Capture-of-Political-Accountability-
.pdf> accessed 5 June 2019. 
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perform a quality assurance test, or even a regulatory role, particularly with regard to 
the processes applied.27   
x Finally (the integrity model), an ombudsman could be treated by the court as a discrete, 
and equal, provider of justice operating entirely separately to the judicial branch. This 
model involves a radical reconceptualization of the constitutional order to conceive 
various specialised autonomous watchdog agents as sitting within a bespoke integrity 
branch operating alongside the political and judicial branches,28 upholding an ever 
more settled range of constitutional values. 29  Within such a model, given its 
autonomous status, arguably the ombudsman should be seen as immune from judicial 
supervision. 
 
The law on the ombudsman sector: routes towards judicial oversight in Australia 
and the UK 
The value of explanatory theories lies in their capacity to reflect accurately practice on the 
ground.30 To establish which of the explanatory models of the ombudsman/judicial relationship 
best captures the real practice of the courts towards the ombudsman sector, for this article we 
interrogated the case law that has evolved around ombudschemes, first in terms of the 
throughput of cases and second with regard to the context of the case law. Our study identified 
legal action initiated both by ombudschemes and by others (the public, agencies etc) which 
                                                 
27
 Bondy and Le Sueur (n 15) 6. 
28
 JJ 6SLJHOPDQµ7KH,QWHJULW\%UDQFKRI*RYHUQPHQW¶Australian Law Journal 724.  
29
 Buck et al (n 3) ch.2. 
30
 Denis *DOOLJDQ µ/HJDO 7KHRU\ DQG (PSLULFDO 5HVHDUFK¶, in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer, The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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provide the judiciary with opportunities for direct and indirect hierarchical control over the 
ombudsman sector.   
(a) Judicial acceptance of legal claims against ombudschemes 
Although legislation provides little detail on the nature of the ombudsman/court relationship, 
in both jurisdictions some express statutory references to judicial input can be found. In 
Australia the judiciary has upheld judicial review of public Ombudsman decision making31 yet 
restrict the appeal of private contractual disputes most often determined by an industry 
Ombudsman into the court system, holding that such ombudschemes do not exercise judicial 
power as their jurisdiction is administrative rather than judicial.32 The result in Australia is that 
many industry ombudschemes may be viewed as outgrowing, at least with respect to judicial 
review, much of the existing judicial accountability framework of judicial review.  
In the UK, legislation says virtually nothing about the role of the courts, but there are 
two schemes which prescribe DSURFHVVRIµDSSHDO¶WRWKHFRXUWIURPan ombudsman decision.33 
For the Scottish Legal Complaints Commissioner (SLCC), this appeal remit has led to eight 
recorded appeals to date since its introduction in 2007, and over 150 recorded appeals for the 
Pensions Ombudsman, which has been operating since 1993.34 This provision for appeal may 
VXJJHVWDµVPDOO-FODLPVFRXUW¶UROHIRUWKHRPEXGVPDQFRQFHUQHGEXWWKHJURXQGVIRUDSSHDO
                                                 
31
 C :KHHOHUµ-XGLFLDOUHYLHZRI$GPLQLVWUDWLYH$FWLRQ$QDGPLQLVWUDWLYHGHFLVLRQ-PDNHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH¶
88 Australian Law Journal 740. 
32
 Mickovski v FOS and Metlife [2012] VSCA 185. 
33
 A similar arrangement is in place for Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman in the Republic of Ireland, 
Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman Act 2017, ss 63-72. 
34
 Access to all the UK cases for all UK based ombudschemes can be made through this online database, 
<https://caselaw.ombudsmanassociation.org/> accessed 25 October 2019.  
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are heavily circumscribed. For the SLCC the available grounds broadly map those in judicial 
review,35 whereas for the Pensions Ombudsman, WKHDSSHDOUHPLWLVµDQ\SRLQWRIODZ¶.36  
Despite the relative lack of legislative reference to the judicial role, in both Australia and 
the UK the courts have, from an early stage, claimed as part of its inherent jurisdiction a 
responsibility to provide supervisory oversight. In the UK, whilst initially reluctant to accept 
the invitation to review decisions of an Ombudsman,37 in R v Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration Ex Parte Dyer38 Lord -XVWLFH6LPRQ%URZQFRQVLGHUHGµWKHSURSHUDPELWRI
WKLV &RXUW¶V VXSHUYLVRU\ MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU WKH 3&$ >3DUOLDPHQWDU\ &RPPLVVLRQHU IRU
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ@¶DQGZHQWRQWRµXQKHVLWDWLQJO\UHMHFW¶WKHDUJXPHQWWKDWMXGLFLDOUHYLHZGLG
not apply.  
Many in government are answerable to Parliament and yet answerable also to the supervisory 
MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKLV &RXUW , VHH QRWKLQJ DERXW WKH 3&$¶V UROH RU WKH VWDWXWRU\ IUDPHZRUN ZLWKLQ 
which he operates so singular as to take him wholly outside the purview of judicial review.39  
1RUGLG/RUG-XVWLFH6LPRQ%URZQDFFHSWWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWµWKH&RXUWVKRXOGLQWHUYHQHRQO\
in the PRVWH[FHSWLRQDOFDVHVRIDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ¶7KLVEURDGFRQFOXVLRQKDVEHHQIROORZHG
in cases on other ombudschemes.40 Similarly in Australia, the judiciary have claimed the power 
to determine issues of jurisdiction as there are no limitations upon judicial review offered to 
                                                 
35
 Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007, s 21 (4). 
36
 Pensions Schemes Act 1993, s 151(4). 
37
 Re Fletcher's Application [1970] 2 All ER 572. 
38
 [1994] 1 WLR 621. 
39
 Ibid, 625. 
40
 Argyll & Bute Council, Re Judicial Review [2007] ScotCS CSOH 168. See also R (Siborurema) v Office of the 
Independent Adjudicator [2007] EWCA Civ 1365 [50], per Pill LJ. 
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any Federal, State or Territory public ombudschemes. In a series of early Victorian cases,41 
this absence of protection provided the court space to read the statutory powers of the Victorian 
Ombudsman to investigate narrowly. Judicial approaches have however since shifted towards 
adopting a broader approach to DQRPEXGVPDQ¶V powers.42 Kirby P (with Sheller and Powell 
JJA agreeing) observing in one such case concerning the NSW Parliamentary Ombudsman that 
µ>7KHSRZHUVRIWKH2PEXGVPDQ@DVWKH2PEXGVPDQ$FWUHYHDOVDUHDVWKH\RXJKWWREH
H[WUHPHO\ZLGH7KH\DUHQRWSRZHUVZKLFKWKLV&RXUWVKRXOGUHDGGRZQ¶43 Nevertheless, it is 
clear that in Australia judicial review still applies to unreasonable decision making that occurs 
in the ombudsman sector.44  
Therefore, across both Australia and the UK, the inherent power of the courts to conduct 
judicial review of ombudschemes has become the norm, and at no point has the political branch 
moved to respond to this development through legislation either by blocking such judicial 
oversight or to insert limitation clauses on the role of the courts.45  The end result is the 
development of a broad body of case law on the ombudsman sector in which detailed reference 
has EHHQPDGHWRWKHVFRSHRIDQRPEXGVPDQ¶VSRZHUV,Q$XVWUDOLDVLQFHWKHILUVW2PEXGVPDQ
was introduced in Western Australia in 1971 there have been 92 reported cases, where an 
                                                 
41
 Booth v Dillon (No 1) [1976] VR 291; Booth v Dillon I(No 2) [1976] VR 434; Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 
550.  
42
 For example, Anti-Discrimination Commissioner v Acting Ombudsman (2003) 11 Tas R 343. 
43
 Botany Council v Ombudsman (1995) 37 NSWLR 357. 
44
 City of Port Adelaide Enfield v Bingham [2014] SASC 36. 
45
 For example, see the Ombudsperson Act 1996 (British Columbia), s ³Proceedings of the Ombudsperson 
must not be challenged, reviewed or called into question by a court, except on the ground of lack or excess of 
MXULVGLFWLRQ´ 
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Ombudsman was joined as a party, decided in Superior Australian courts. In the UK, there have 
been 110 reported cases heard by way of judicial review.46    
This expanding body of case law confirms that the genie is out of the bottle in the 
ombudsman/court relationship, insofar as it has now become an established practice for courts 
to provide an oversight role. Nevertheless, with the exception of the Pensions Ombudsman in 
the UK, the quantity of cases taken against ombudschemes remains relatively small once the 
turnover of complaints is taken into account. Further, the success rate of claimants is relatively 
low in judicial review, albeit it varies between countries. In Australia, of the 92 decisions only 
7% have found against an ombudsman,47 and in the UK 32%.48 Finally, even if we broaden the 
picture to factor in the potential for out of court settlements, a recent study in the UK has found 
little evidence of judicial review being a commonly used redress route for claimants.49  
(b) Ombudsman generated use of courts 
The case law in both countries reveals that the most common claimant in judicial review is an 
individual. The dominant incidence of claimant-led review may very well be due to the absence 
of a professional body to whom complainants may take a complaint concerning an ombudsman, 
                                                 
46
 Richard Kirkham, The Ombudsman and the Courts (Nuffield Foundation, 2020) (forthcoming). 
47
 See: Glenister v Dillon [1976] VR 550; Booth v Dillon (No 2) [1976] VR 434; The Ombudsman v Koopman 
(2003) 58 NSWLR 182; The Ombudsman v Laughton (2005) 64 NSWLR 114; Owen v Ombudsman (Boyce) (1999) 
131 NTR 15; Moroney v The Ombudsman [1982] 2 NSWLR 591 overruled on appeal in The Ombudsman v 
Moroney [1983] 1 NSWLR 317. There are examples of mixed findings such as Chairperson, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman (1995) 39 ALD 570. 
48
 Kirkham (n 46) 26.  
49
 Richard .LUNKDP µ-XGLFLDO 5HYLHZ /LWLJDWLRQ (IIHFWV DQG WKH 2PEXGVPDQ¶   Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 110. 
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reflecting the regulatory gap which the courts must then fill.50 In other words, without an 
alternative oversight organisation, complaints to an independent tier can only be made to the 
courts. There may be other reasons for the disparity. For instance, public bodies may choose 
not to litigate against ombudschemes very often, as by law they are able to avoid 
recommendations they do not agree with. Likewise, industry bodies might litigate against 
ombudschemes less frequently because they calculate that commercially it is unlikely to be 
beneficial to take expensive and potentially long lasting court actions.   
However, there are interactions between courts and ombudschemes which are 
legislatively prescribed and triggered by an Ombudsman. 51  In Australia ombudschemes 
generally have provision to apply to court for a determination as to questions of jurisdiction.52 
Such provisions have been both used and their use contested. 53  In the UK, only two 
ombudschemes possess such a reference power and in neither country has this power been used 
very often.54 Another reason for an ombudsman to access court would be to enforce its legal 
powers to collate evidence during an investigation, including the attendance of witnesses.  Due 
to the clarity of ombudsman legislation and institutional acceptance, this is an option that 
ombudschemes have only rarely been required to pursue. A small number of other cases are 
                                                 
50
 Rob Behrens, Being an Ombudsman in Higher Education (ENOHE, 2018) <http://www.enohe.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Being-an-ombudsman.pdf> accessed 4 January 2019. 
51
 One such prescription is that judges and courts are explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
ombudschemes however registrars and staff of the courts or tribunals may be within jurisdiction. 
52
 Attorney-General v Glass (in her capacity as Ombudsman) [2016] VSCA 306. 
53
 For example, McGuirk v NSW Ombudsman [2008] NSWCA 357; Kaldas v Barbour [2017] NSWCA 275 
discussing section 35B of the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW).   
54
 Attorney-General v Glass (in her capacity as Ombudsman) [2016] VSCA 306. In the Pensions Ombudsman 
scheme, this is allowed for under section 150(7) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 but has been a rarely used 
provision, for example see The Pensions Ombudsman v EMC Europe Ltd & Ors [2012] EWHC 3508 (Ch). 
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initiated by ombudschemes, for reasons of striking out claims and pursuing costs.55 Of the 8 
Australian cases brought by an Ombudsman, 6 were appeals, in response to litigation originally 
brought against the Ombudsman office.56 In the UK, there has only ever been one appeal 
brought by an ombudsman.57 
The above actions suggest that ombudschemes, like other litigants, are not immune 
from using the court process to exert power and protect their position. However, the overall 
pattern of an OPEXGVPDQ¶VXVHRIWKHODZLVRQHRIORZGLUHFWXVHRIWKHFRXUWVZLWKPRUH
forceful legal arguments being deployed in only limited and reactive ways. 
 
&RQFOXVLRQ7KHMXGLFLDU\¶VVXSHUYLVRU\UROHLQFRPPRQODZWKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFH 
Albeit that the approaches adopted in Australia and the UK differ on the detail, in the judicial 
oversight of ombudschemes there are strong similarities. For both countries, the above 
overview indicates that the supervisory model is the strongest account of the Ombudsman/court 
relationship. Both the fully fledged political accountability and integrity models would be most 
obviously realised by the statutory exclusion of the judiciary from oversight of ombudschemes, 
but these are not present in legislation and the courts have not denied themselves jurisdiction. 
By contrast, the small claims court model would be evidenced by a predominance of appeal 
outlets from an Ombudsman decision, which again are not generally built into Ombudsman 
legislation. The only exceptions are the SLCC and the Pensions Ombudsman in the UK which 
                                                 
55
 For example, Leach, Re [2001] EWHC Admin 455. 
56
 Anita 6WXKPFNHµ2PEXGVPDQ/LWLJDWLRQ7KH5HODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH$XVWUDOLDQ2PEXGVPDQDQGWKH
&RXUWV¶, in Greg Weeks and Matthew Groves (eds), Administrative Redress In and Out of the Courts Essays in 
Honour of Robin Creyke and John McMillan (Sydney,  Federation Press, 2019). 
57
 JR 55 [2016] UKSC 22 [1]. 
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both offer only heavily restricted appeals processes on points of law. The Pensions 
Ombudsman is the one scheme in this study that might fit within the small claims model, with 
appeals heard at a rate of less than one every 1,000 complaints.58  However, the Pensions 
Ombudsman is atypical in the ombudsman sector, possessing a slightly broader remit than other 
schemes.59  
Constitutionally, therefore, ombudschemes are treated by the courts as autonomously 
powerful in their own right but the court exercises a reserve oversight role on their operations, 
in addition to considering specific statutory obligations on an Ombudsman. However, 
questions follow from this observation as to how intensively the judiciary has performed this 
supervisory role, and indeed how intensively it should perform the role JLYHQDQ2PEXGVPDQ¶V
specialised justice function. This debate is explored in the next section by reviewing what the 
case law tells us about the MXGLFLDU\¶VDSSURDFK.  
 
The Intensity of Judicial Scrutiny  
Judicial impacts: an analysis of the case law  
The literature on the correct parameters of the judicial role in public law is wide and contains 
considerable disagreement.60 One of the points of contestation is the extent to which the courts 
should depart from generalisable norms to construct contextual bespoke solutions depending 
upon the public body being reviewed.61 By providing the judiciary with a new form of public 
                                                 
58
 Kirkham (n 46) 46. 
59
 )RUH[DPSOH WKH3HQVLRQV2PEXGVPDQFDQ µLQYHVWLJDWHDQGGHWHUPLQH«DQ\GLVSXWHRI IDFWRU ODZ    LQ
relation to an occupational or personal pHQVLRQVFKHPH«¶Pensions Schemes Act 1993, s 146(1)(c)). 
60
 Eg -$.LQJµInstitutional Approaches to Judicial RestrainW¶2-/6.QLJKWQ 
61
 (J&RPSDUH&KULVWRSKHU)RUV\WKµ%ODVSKHP\$JDLQVW%DVLFV'RFWULQH&RQFHSWXDO5HDVRQLQJDQG&HUWDLQ
'HFLVLRQVRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶LQ%HOO-(OOLRWW09DUXKDV-	0XUUD\3HGVPublic Law Adjudication in 
Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Hart, 2016) with JR Bell, µ5HWKLQNLQJWKH6WRU\RICart v Upper 
Tribunal DQG,WV,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZ¶(2019) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 39, 74±99.  
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authority to adjudicate over, the advent into the legal order of transplanted watchdog 
institutions, such as ombudschemes, illustrates one potential driver for such bespoke patterns 
in judicial decision-making.  
 
The shifting nature of these patterns can be illustrated by the four explanatory models to the 
judiciary/ombudsman relationship described earlier in this paper: the small claims model, the 
political accountability model, the supervisory model and the integrity model. We hypothesise 
that the judiciary can shift its decision-making to any of these positions. Potentially the 
judiciary could adapt its role to be more proactively supportive of an 2PEXGVPDQ¶V
autonomous and specialised nature, as designed and intended by Parliament, either to confirm 
its full autonomous status from judicial oversight and/or to confirm the primary supervisory 
role of the political branch. Alternatively, the judiciary might be incentivised to be more 
interventionist in ombudsman judicial review because an Ombudsman lacks democratic 
legitimacy and/or should be held to higher standards because of its role as a provider of justice. 
These different results may be achieved through constraining or amplifying the statutory 
instrument which created the ombudsman in question. Moreover, such adaptations could be 
achieved through the judge departing from its traditional role as interpreters of statute law, in 
order to place more emphasis on the role of an Ombudsman within the common law 
constitutional landscape, including its unique history and nature.   
To establish the practice of the courts and to look for evidence of an institutionally 
focused approach, we interrogated the reasoning applied in all case law on ombudschemes in 
Australia and the UK. This study indicated a number of common themes at play in the manner 
in which the courts scrutinise ombudschemes, which illustrate ongoing shifts in the judicial 
role caused by their introduction and the development of a bespoke body of jurisprudence 
DURXQGWKHRPEXGVPDQ¶VEHVSRNHUROH.  
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(a) Judicial deference to the political model  
As noted above, courts in Australia and the UK have treated ombudschemes as within their 
general jurisdiction. Nevertheless, a central issue is the extent to which the ombudsman 
institution should be treated by the courts as a standard statutory creature only, or a special 
form of statutory creature with a unique history. This question goes to the heart of the generalist 
versus contextualist debate in administrative law.  
Recent research from Australia and the UK has demonstrated that in the bulk of cases 
on ombudschemes, some form of exercise in statutory interpretation is the most common 
ground upon which the judgment is resolved.62 In other words, legislative intention remains 
the main driving factor behind judicial decision-making just as in other areas of administrative 
law.   
Despite this finding, we suggest that, on balance, the unique nature of the sector has 
been influential on the courts, with an appreciation of the special role of the ombudsman 
institution reflected in multiple judgments. For instance, in the most senior case on public 
services ombudschemes in the UK, Lord Sumption stated that ombudschemes, while statutory 
bodies µIXOILO DQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ PHGLDWLQJEHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH DQG WKHSXEOLF
VHUYLFHRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGWKHFLWL]HQRQWKHRWKHU¶63 Similarly in Australia, Bathurst CJ and 
Basten JA have observed that the powers of the NSW Ombudsman is fundamentally different 
from decisions of courts because there is no determination of rights or liabilities and that the 
design of an Ombudsman µis consistent with an intention that his or her activities be overseen 
by Parliament rather than the Courts.¶64 Indeed, across a large body of case law the approach 
LQERWKMXULVGLFWLRQVPD\EHFKDUDFWHULVHGDVRQHRIµKDQGVRII¶6RPHWLPHVWKLVGHIHUHQWLDO
                                                 
62
  Stuhmcke (n 56); Kirkham (n 45).  
63
 JR55 (n 56). 
64
 Kaldas v Barbour [2017] NSWCA 275 [27]-[28].   
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stance has approached a position of non-justiciability, as in Ainsworth v The Ombudsman,65 in 
which the court excluded judicial review due to a privative section, stating that the NSW 
2PEXGVPDQRIILFHLVDµ«XQLTXHLQVWLWXWLRQ,WGRHVQRWGHDOGLUHFWO\RUin any legal way with 
OHJDOULJKWV¶« DQGLVµDFUHDWXUHRID3DUOLDPHQW¶.66  
In the UK, in recognition of this special role, the courts have been careful consistently to 
issue deferential VWDWHPHQWVDERXWWKHFRXUW¶VUROHLQMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ, even though it has never 
conceded the inherent jurisdiction to review all aspects of ombudsman decision-making.  
>7@KH&RXUW¶V VXSHUYLVRU\ MXULVGLFWLRQ VKRXOGEH H[HUFLVHG ZLWK VHQVLWLYLW\ WR WKH VSHFLDO QDWXUHRI WKH
>6FRWWLVK3XEOLF6HUYLFHV@2PEXGVPDQ¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDO role and function.67  
Equivalent statements can be found within the case law across multiple schemes in the UK68 
and also in Australia. For instance, Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman Ltd v 
Commissioner of State Revenue69 the Victorian Supreme Court upheld the charitable status of 
the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO), acknowledging that it e[LVWV µ«WR
UHGUHVVWKHSRZHULPEDODQFHEHWZHHQWKHFRQVXPHUDQGWKHLQGXVWU\¶70 
Thus although it is too much to claim that the courts characterise ombudschemes to 
possess some form of special legal status, there is in the majority of ombudsman cases, a 
judicial recognition of a bespoke ombudsman role which is often expressed in terms of 
deference to their decision-making. This position at a minimum demonstrates that the courts 
                                                 
65
 (1988) 17 NSWLR 276. 
66
 Ainsworth v The Ombudsman (1988) 17 NSWLR 276, 283. 
67
 Argyll & Buter Council v SPSO [2007] CSOH 168 [16]. 
68
 For example, R (Crawford) v The Legal Ombudsman & Anor [2014] EWHC 182; Muldoon v Independent Police 
Complaints Commission [2009] EWHC 3633 at para 19; Martin, Re: Judicial Review [2012] NIQB 89 at paras 
28±30 (Northern Ireland Police Ombudsman).  
69
 [2017] VSC 286. 
70
 Ibid [22]. 
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appreciate that the office has been established and specifically designed to deliver an essential 
function, and that the court is obliged to support and acknowledge that function.  
(b) Judicial support for the integrity model  
Ombudschemes, therefore, are recognised as a bespoke form of statutory body, whose broad 
function is neither ignored nor determinative of the court¶s reasoning.  However, this approach 
has not entailed complete deference to the sector such that it can operate autonomously of 
judicial oversight. An underlying judicial purpose here has been to safeguard the superior 
authority of the courts and the flexible non-legal jurisdiction of the ombudsman. Hence, in at 
least one specific respect the courts in both Australia and the UK have been keen to detail the 
constitutional position of the ombudsman beyond that defined in legislation: namely, to 
confirm the boundaries of WKHRPEXGVPDQVHFWRU¶Voperations as it relates to other institutions. 
For instance, in the UK the courts have been required to resolve disputes between an 
ombudsman and a regulator, 71  and the boundary lines between the competences of an 
ombudsman and the university sector.72 More generally, the judiciary have worked to establish 
a coherent demarcation of responsibility between the courts and the ombudsman sector.  
A good example of this activity from Australia are the challenges made to the 
constitutional legitimacy of industry Ombudsman schemes.73 This case law confirms a clear 
judicial distinction between ombudsman and courts, specifically, that at the Federal level, 
where under the Commonwealth Constitution, industry Ombudsman are not considered courts 
and hence do not exercise judicial power. On this point, there is equivalent jurisprudence in the 
                                                 
71
 Council of The Law Society of Scotland v The Scottish Legal Complaints Commission [2017] ScotCS CSIH 36. 
72
 For example Cardao-Pito v Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education & Anor [2012] EWHC 
203. 
73
 For a state industry ombudscheme example see: Citipower Pty Ltd v Electricity Industry Ombudsman (Victoria) 
Ltd (1995) VSC 275. 
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UK. For instance, in Maxwell v OIA, the court found that the Independent Adjudicator could 
not be required to adjudicate on a matter under discrimination legislation as that was covered 
by a separate legal process.74   
Safeguarding the authority of the courts also impacts the decision making standards 
applied by ombudschemes and has resulted in judicial endorsement of internal standards of 
µRPEXGVPDQU\¶, with ombudschemes free to create norms to resolve disputes rather than 
necessarily applying only settled legal principles. 75  This was the issue in Australian 
Communications Authority v Viper where Justice Sackville held the Telecommunication 
Industry Ombudsman (TIO) to be free to resolve disputes according to µZKDW LV IDLU DQG
UHDVRQDEOHLQDOO WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶, as well as apply µWKHODZ¶.76 His Honour observed that 
many of the complaints the TIO might deal with ± such as back-billing and lack of telephone 
number portability ± would be difficult to resolve by the application of established legal norms. 
A similar line of reasoning has been applied to the ombudsman sector in the UK. British 
Bankers Association v The Financial Services Authority & Anor77 held it to be lawful to oblige 
financial firms to abide by the bespoke rules issued by the Financial Services Authority even 
in the absence of specific legislative requirements. These rules shaped the manner in which 
insurance policies including Payment Protection Policies could be sold and the court also ruled 
                                                 
74
 R (Maxwell) v OIAHE [2011] EWCA Civ 1236 [32]-[33]. 
75
 MASU Financial Management Pty Ltd v Financial Industry Complaints Service Limited and Julie Wong (No. 
1) [2004] NSWSC 826 and Australian Communications Authority v Viper [2001] FCA 637; Wealthcare Financial 
Planning P/L v FICS & Norris [2009] VSC 7; As such judicial review of some industry schemes is limited to 
decisions which are unfair and unreasonable see Mickovski v FOS and Metlife [2011] VSC 257; [2012] VSCA 
185 and Mickovski v FOS and Metlife [012] VSCA 185 [51]. 
76
 Australian Communications Authority v Viper [2001] FCA 63 [72]. 
77
 [2011] EWHC 999 (Admin). 
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that it was lawful for the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) to base its decisions on those 
rules.  
(c) Judicial provision of a supervisory model 
7KHFDVHODZFRQVLGHUHGXSWRWKLVSRLQWPLJKWEHWDNHQWRVXJJHVWWKDWWKHFRXUW¶VDSSURDFKWR
ombudschemes is largely focused on policing its boundaries and carving out a discrete role for 
the office largely overseen by the political branch. Indeed, in terms of efficiency the courts 
have proven that they will not over-burden the justice system by considering only a small 
number of ombudsman disputes and, where possible, avoiding duplication of casework due to 
the existence of two potential opportunities for dispute resolution on ostensibly the same set of 
facts.78 In the UK, multiple cases reflect upon the correct distribution of cases between the 
ombudsman sector and judicial review, and the question of admissability of a claim in court79 
or the nature of tKHRPEXGVPDQ¶VZRUN80 
Nevertheless, in some important ways the courts have additionally demonstrated a 
willingness to adopt a bespoke supervisory approach to ombudsman judicial review. In both 
countries judicial review by the courts, while retrospective in application, also offers external 
quality assurance of decision making by an Ombudsman, and in this field the courts have 
shown some willingness to operate in a more interventionist fashion. The level of quality 
control imposed is constrained by common law principles in order to avoid the court 
intervening too readily in public decision-making. The Australian approach is most recently 
applied in the South Australian decision City of Port Adelaide Enfield v Bingham,81 where the 
standard applied when reviewing the South Australian Ombudsman decisions was that of 
                                                 
78
 For example, Clark & Anor v In Focus Asset Management & Tax Solutions Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 118. 
79
 For example Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2003] EWCA Civ 1406 [81]. 
80
 For example Clark v Argyle Consulting Ltd [2010] ScotCS CSOH 154. 
81
 [2014] SASC 36. 
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Wednesbury unreasonableness. On the facts, it was held that the µ2PEXGVPDQ¶VRSLQLRQGRHV
not fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the 
IDFWVDQGWKHODZ7KLVFRQFOXVLRQODFNVDQHYLGHQWDQGLQWHOOLJHQWMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶82 In Australia 
such decisions, which evaluate the standard of Ombudsman decision making, are rare and far 
more commonly dealt with (at least before the superior courts) is resolution of constitutional 
or jurisdictional issues as discussed above.   
However, the evidence from the UK is that the courts can and do adjust the parameters 
of administrative law standards specifically in order to raise the expectations on the qualities 
of decision-making in the ombudsman sector in several respects. In particular, unlike Australia, 
in the UK the most common ground for a decision of an Ombudsman to be quashed is the 
quality of the explanation of its decision, either because of inadequate reasons (12 cases)83 or 
because the decision was found to be irrational (10 cases).84  Indeed, this approach to review 
accounts for more than half the cases in which ombudsman decisions have been quashed.85 
This outcome suggests that the court can adjust the parameters of their role to play a strong 
supervisory role in the context of the ombudsman sector. Far from being deferential, the courts 
are demanding of a partner justice institution high MXGLFLDO H[SHFWDWLRQV RI µDdequate and 
FRPSUHKHQVLEOHUHDVRQV¶IRUGHFLVLRQVPDGH86  
In line with these findings, multiple other cases in the UK provide added judicial 
instruction on the standards that can be expected of the decision of an Ombudsman.87 This 
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 Ibid, [61].  
83
 Kirkham (n 46) B16. 
84
 Ibid, B 17. 
85
 Ibid, B 12. 
86
 Bartos v A Decision of The Scottish Legal Complaints Commission [2015] SC 690 [1]. 
87
 Kirkham (n 45) B17. 
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indicates a significant pattern of judicial behaviour, in which the courts have consistently 
required higher standards than legislation has provided for. Nor has there been strict adherence, 
or often even reference to,88 the general case law on reasons, lending the impression that a 
bespoke legal standard is being developed for the ombudsman sector. Indeed, the operational 
and non-judicial context of the ombudsman institution has been regularly noted in determining 
the relevant standards of reasoning that should apply.89 These standards are not akin to judicial 
standards,90 but the expectations of the court have been regularly detailed in the case law,91 and 
include an expectation of accessibility to all relevant parties.92 Further, this duty to provide 
reasons extends beyond final reports to include other stages of the decision-making process.93  
(d) Judicial support for small claims court standards 
When cRQVLGHULQJ WKH QDWXUH RI WKH FRXUW¶V SRWHQWLDO UROH as a supervisor, obiter and other 
statements of the court are also relevant. Here judicial guidance is sometimes used to deliver a 
public interest message of disapproval over and above the decision rendered, or to act as nudges 
to the ombudsman scheme in question to revise practices more in line with expectations of a 
quasi-judicial body operating alongside the court system. This form of guidance offers possible 
judicial support for ombudschemes acting as a modified version of a small claims court. By 
way of example, in the UK case of Bartos v SLCC the court reminded an ombudsman of the 
LPSRUWDQFHRILPSDUWLDOLW\DQGSRVVHVVLQJZLWKLQLWVWHDPVWDIIRIµDSSURSULDWHEDFNJURXQGDQG
VWDQGLQJ¶WRSHUIRUPWKHIXQFWLRQLWKDGEHHQDOORFDWHGZKLFKLQWKLVFDVHZDVGHDOLQJZLWK
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complaints against the legal profession.94 Similarly, in Stenhouse v The Legal Ombudsman the 
judge expressed profound concern as to the formal legal costs of litigation involved in resolving 
WKHGLVSXWHZKLFKZHUHµRXWRIDOOSURSRUWLRQWR WKHVXPVDWVWDNH¶95 Most recently the UK 
courts have provided guidance on the importance of not being seen to predetermine a decision 
when issuing a preliminary finding of fact.96 In comparison there are only rare instances where 
Australian judicial commentary has recognised frailty of ombudspractice. Support for the 
notion of ombudschemes as small claims courts is difficult to glean in an Australian context. 
One such comment is that of Sackville AJ in Commissioner of Police v The Ombudsman97 
QRWLQJKXPDQIUDLOW\µWKH2PEXGVPDQLVIDOOLEOHDQGPD\HUU+HRUVKHPD\HYHQIDLOWRDFW
LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKVWDWXWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWV¶ 
As noted above, with the heavily qualified exception of two schemes, the courts do not 
directly integrate ombudsman decision-making into their hierarchy. However, there is a small, 
but significant, body of case law that has evolved in the UK which indirectly provides greater 
legal force to Ombudsman decisions. By statute, ombudsman determinations have no legal 
force. Yet in a series of cases the courts have concluded that it possesses the power to review 
not just decisions of ombudschemes, but also public authorities who have decided not to 
comply with the  decision of an Ombudsman.98 In this body of four cases, the power that the 
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FRXUWVH[HUW LV LQUHODWLRQWR WKHOHJDOLW\RIWKHSXEOLFERG\¶VUHVSRQVHZLWKDOOIRXUUXOLQJV
making it clear that a public body cannot simply assert that the findings of the Ombudsman are 
wrong, and thereby refuse to implement an OPEXGVPDQ¶VUHcommendations on the basis that 
the report is flawed.  
Australian case law is more tangential on this point and courts have directed the role of 
government bodies in relation to an Ombudsman through questions around the powers of the 
Ombudsman to issue reports or make findings rather than the refusal of government bodies to 
comply. For example, the decision in Chairperson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission v Commonwealth Ombudsman99 was one where the Federal Court gave a narrow 
reading to the &RPPRQZHDOWK 2PEXGVPDQ¶V SRZHU WR PDNH D µILQGLQJ¶ LQ D UHSRUW, thus 
confirming that the finding did not apply to the individuals of the Government Department and 
the Ombudsman had acted beyond power. 
 
Detailing the judicial role in case law on the ombudsman sector 
Our study finds a reactive and limited supervisory role for courts in relation to ombudschemes. 
As with standard commonwealth common law constitutionalism, post-facto judicial controls 
of bureaucratic power are strong,100 but control is generally limited. Relatively few cases are 
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heard by way of judicial review, and the dominant mode of judicial reasoning is through 
formalist techniques of statutory interpretation. Not only is the case law highly deferential to 
the role of the ombudsman institution in language, but the low success rates for claimants 
suggest that courts are reluctant to overrule the decision of an Ombudsman.   
However, case law on ombudschemes also indicates a subtle shifting of the judicial role 
towards a more interventionist and bespoke approach, which highlights the flexibility inherent 
in judicial review. For instance, in both jurisdictions the courts have tested the quality of 
decisions made by ombudschemes and there have been multiple instances of the courts 
determining the institutional boundaries between ombudschemes and other public bodies. In 
the UK at least, there is also clear evidence of the development of the law to infer more robust 
procedural standards of decision-making on the sector and the creation of a new remedy to 
make it more difficult for public bodies to resist the recommendations of an ombudsman. The 
intensity of the review has gone further in the UK than in Australia, reflecting a more 
conservative nature of administrative law encouraged by the Australian constitution. But even 
here, an extra-judicial statement by Chief Justice Bathurst hints that Australian jurisprudence 
could evolve further in this area: 
In many ways, our modern notions of accountability have outgrown our constitutional framework. As 
the landscape of public power continues to evolve, with the soft power of integrity bodies growing in 
importance, the question of whether we protect our modern expanded concept of accountability or limit 
the safeguarded territory to the much smaller ground it occupied in 1901 is a challenge we must 
increasingly confront.101     
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We suggest that two main factors likely drive this move towards a bespoke approach 
for case law on the ombudsman sector, and that these factors illustrate the institutional drivers 
that influence judicial decision-making in the common law. Firstly, the work of the courts is 
driven by an interpretation of statute that ombudschemes are, if not situated in a distinct 
integrity branch of the constitution, distinct in their character and by their nature requiring of a 
special judicial approach. This claim is in part counter-intuitive, as in certain respects the 
influence of the judiciary has operated to restrict the autonomy of an Ombudsman, either by 
establishing clear boundary lines around its operations or adding detail to its procedural design 
or even in quashing the substance of its decisions. However, judicial recognition and evolution 
of the law around the existing institutional GHVLJQFDQDVVLVWDQ2PEXGVPDQ¶VRSHUDWLRQE\
making it more institutionally resistant, and embedded, in the constitutional order. Further, 
through the process of channelling disputes about an Ombudsman through the courts, the room 
for both public and private bodies to pressurise an Ombudsman in its operation is reduced, and 
the institutional status of the office is enhanced. In this sense the ombudsman institution is 
gradually removed from the direct oversight of the political branch and provided with a more 
secure autonomy. Hence, with the assistance of the judiciary, the ombudsman sector can 
become more capable of operating in line with an µ,QWHJULW\¶ YLVLRQ RI WKH FRPPRQ ODZ
constitution by which watchdogs are considered autonomous actors.102 Autonomy for integrity 
institutions, in other words, is not necessarily best served by being outside the purview of the 
judiciary. 
A second key factor behind the bespoke approach towards the ombudsman sector is the 
need to address an XQGHUO\LQJSUREOHPRIµXQGHU-UHJXODWLRQ¶,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHFRXUWVLQERWK
the UK and Australia are µIRUFHG¶WRILOODJDSWKDWFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWVKDYHFUHDWHG
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and that the remaining traditional institutions, the government and the legislature, have proved 
incapable or unwilling to address. In performing this institution-building and supportive role, 
the judiciary might inevitably be drawn into a regulatory role if it is regularly overseeing 
internal decision-making standards as well as adjudicating on jurisdictional boundaries 
between the plethora of dispute resolution schemes. In this respect, normative and pragmatic 
questions arise as to whether the constitutional positioning of courts in the Anglo-
Commonwealth system of government means that they are well suited to perform this role. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
Through an empirical study of case law this article has explored the relationship between the 
judiciary and the ombudsman sector. It argues that in Australia and the UK the relationship is 
predominantly a supervisory one.  
However, common law grounds of administrative law are inherently flexible, and in 
Australia and the UK the court has used its powers to develop an evolving bespoke 
ombudsman-focused body of legal reasoning and guidance. In many respects, this evolution of 
the law might be considered unremarkable and is built upon long entrenched features of the 
judicial role, such as principles of statutory interpretation and loyalty to presumed legislative 
intent. Nevertheless, in the context of ombudschemes, the court¶s capacity selectively to 
assume a role in filling in the gaps left undetailed by legislation in accordance with the 
presumed intention of the legislature has provided opportunities for the courts to shape the 
landscape in which an Ombudsman operates. Our study demonstrates that this gap-filling 
capacity, particularly in the UK but also in Australia, has at times drifted into an institutional 
design role. Its effects have been to strengthen the ombudsman institution and have helped 
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transition it from a graft on the Anglo-Constitutional system of government to become an 
integral part of UK and Australian administrative law. 
The adoption of this role raises the issue of the impact of that judicial supervision upon 
the Anglo-Constitutional system of government. The nature of this supervisory role by and of 
itself highlights a binary anomaly in the placement of the ombudsman institution within 
common law constitutions. The first part of this binary is that the very informality, which is the 
essence of effective ombudsman dispute resolution, may be frustrated by the formality of the 
constitutional framework within which the schemes exist and were introduced to improve. As 
the judicial decisions evidence, ombudschemes through judicial review become part of the very 
structure they were created to supplement and remedy. At the extreme this may lead to a form 
of regulatory capture or incorporation of judicial standards into ombudsman norms. Here the 
concern is that courts become a de facto regulator for ombudschemes, weakening their intended 
operation through reducing the flexibility and informality that is their strength. The second 
anomaly is that judicial oversight masks existing gaps in regulation by the executive and 
parliamentary branches of government. Ombudschemes are part of the government and as such 
their decision making may be political in nature, having significant interaction with public 
policy. By contrast, judicial accountability forces a relationship between courts and 
ombudschemes that provides an apparent safeguard around the quality of decision-making. The 
risk here is that the existence of this safety net encourages the executive and legislature to 
continue with ad hoc and non-systematic reform of integrity institutions, and at worst facilitates 
the government in weakening or reducing the impact of the institutions intended to hold them 
accountable.   
Current case law reflects a judicial awareness of this anomaly. Courts have created a 
jurisprudence around the institution, most often recognising it as a statutory creature with a 
special mandate. This highlights the difficulty for the judiciary in maintaining the line between 
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meaningful supervision and avoiding judicial overreach in the political positioning of the 
institution. However, it is difficult to see whether this challenging role can be avoided, 
particularly as we see the supervisory role of the judiciary, complemented by self-regulation of 
ombudschemes, as set to continue. Indeed, in both Australia and the UK there is no evidence 
that parliament will fill the regulatory gap any time soon and the case law uncovered in this 
article suggests that in a myriad of ways judicial practice will continue to evolve a bespoke 
body of law around the ombudsman sector. If this situation continues, at what point will this 
judicial role transform either the courts or ombudschemes into a justice mechanism they were 
never intended to be?  
The answer we suggest is one best not waited for. Instead, we advocate a holistic 
regulatory review of the ombudsman sector to provide a proactive and timely solution to a 
regulatory issue which is currently resolved in an ad hoc manner across Anglo-Constitutional 
systems of government. Such reviews should be repeated on a periodic basis in order to reduce 
the pressure on the judiciary, and should lead to regular updating of parent legislation. A further 
necessary development, one which requires further discussion and which is already in train, is 
that the sector becomes gradually more professionalized and self-regulation more a feature of 
its operation. 
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